

DRAFT

Knowledge management challenges in the development of intelligence-led policing

Jerry H. Ratcliffe

In press draft. Please be aware that the final version may be different due to changes made by the editor or publisher.

Please cite as:

Ratcliffe, J.H. (in press) 'Knowledge management challenges in the development of intelligence-led policing', in T. Williamson (Ed) *The Handbook of Knowledge-Based Policing: Current Conceptions and Future Directions* (Chichester: John Wiley and Sons).

Introduction

Building on Brodeur and Dupont's opening chapter on knowledge-based policing, this chapter argues that their conceptualisation of knowledge (as it applied to policing) can be further disaggregated into 'old' and 'new' knowledge. Old knowledge consists of information which has been traditionally respected within the realms of law enforcement and relates to the activities of criminals. It is knowledge gleaned through traditional law enforcement techniques such as informant handling, investigation and investigative interviewing. I argue here that a new kind of knowledge has evolved due to the rapid digitization in the last twenty years, a greater understanding of crime and police effectiveness in combating and reducing crime, and a new era of accountability. This 'new' knowledge is represented by a broader interpretation of intelligence and encompasses approaches such as crime mapping, trend and demographic analysis, and strategic intelligence using open source information. Unlike old knowledge, the new intelligence is held by people who rarely leave the police station and who might also be civilians in a sworn world. This slow paradigm shift on what information is perceived as significant and valuable has taken most police agencies into uncharted territory both culturally and organizationally, and has the potential to change the dynamics of long-held notions of value and worth within policing. These challenges to the traditional hegemony are discussed in the chapter. The chapter starts by outlining old and new knowledge, and then considers their place within the framework of current law enforcement structures, structures that are not necessarily efficiently organized to funnel crime analysis and criminal intelligence to the right people.

In the opening chapter of this book, Jean-Paul Brodeur and Benoît Dupont articulate many of the problems associated with defining knowledge, an essential component of any attempt to characterize the current trend in law enforcement management as a knowledge-based paradigm. They are also right to suggest that we are not yet at the stage where knowledge (in its various manifestations) forms the dominant influence to a police decision-maker's strategic operations, though this is a developing possibility. The current situation is probably such that there is a slow, but growing, realization that information and knowledge management are central to effective policing decisions. Brodeur and Dupont are right to be a little cautious in their appraisal. It would be easy to gaze into the future and envisage a policing nirvana, where policing decisions would be centred on a thorough grounding in effective tactics, a comprehensive view of the criminal environment based on an integration of crime analysis and criminal intelligence, a complete understanding of criminological theory and the crime reduction principles of environmental criminology, and where police and other non-law enforcement partners in the crime prevention milieu interact through equal and mutually-beneficial partnerships. But this is a goal that is still quite distant for a few communities, and may remain a complete fantasy for most.

This chapter aims to build on the work of Brodeur and Dupont by exploring some of the predominantly internal issues surrounding the

development of knowledge within local law enforcement agencies. In particular, the chapter will explore changes that have occurred in the management of information within police departments over the last twenty years or so. Here the emphasis will be more on local concerns with high volume crime, rather than the terrorism and high policing (Brodeur, 1983) concerns from the first chapter. It is argued that there has been a dominant form of knowledge, long respected and revered in law enforcement, centred on information known about offenders. The dominance of this 'old knowledge' has been recently challenged by the growth of a 'new knowledge', one that focuses more on the crime event rather than the criminal. This new challenger provides opportunities for police departments to respond better to crime, but also causes a myriad problems for organizations, problems to which police departments have yet to fully embrace and resolve. The move from the old 'criminal knowledge' to a more embracing 'crime knowledge' is rife with organizational and cultural issues for police departments, some of which will be discussed in this chapter. However before getting to that point, some clarity as to old and new knowledge is required.

Old knowledge

To better understand the new challenges for intelligence-led and knowledge-based policing, it may be useful to explore the existing hierarchical structure of knowledge value in the policing domain. While knowledge is power, not all knowledge is equal.

Modern policing had hardly been in operation long before certain types of knowledge were being prized above others. Although London's Metropolitan Police was founded in 1829 on the principle of crime prevention as the primary motive for police operations (Mayne, 1829), the introduction of detectives and plain clothes personnel changed the dynamic considerably. Indeed it has been argued that the move away from crime prevention to a preoccupation with detection began with the hiring of the first plain-clothed 'intelligent men' in the early 1840s, hired to investigate and recover stolen jewellery (Ross, 2005). A terrorist bombing in London in 1867 sparked the creation of the first formal detective department, and although originally viewed by the public with suspicion, the detective role has been on the rise ever since (Audit Commission, 1993). By 1963 every force in England and Wales had a detective bureau and since that time policing has tended to idolise detectives and rewarded them for their knowledge of the criminal environment, and of offenders in particular. In a culture where knowledge is power (Ericson & Haggerty, 1997: 317), the power that has traditionally been respected, treasured and retained by individual officers has been knowledge that can solve individual cases. As a result, the detective function - a function which emphasises the case-specific and investigative facet of law enforcement - has become a prized position within policing. Along with its elevated status, the position has a number of perks for detectives, such as an associated reward structure and significant public recognition. All of this is based largely on a myth of specialised knowledge retained by the detective and withheld from the rest of the police department. I

DRAFT

say myth, because there is evidence that many investigative practices have largely remained stagnant over the last thirty years, and the increase in the use of investigative technologies within policing (such as automated fingerprint identification, DNA analysis and computerized databases) has not apparently provided a discernable benefit to clearance rates for most agencies. Researchers lament that;

It is ironic that these advances have not been accompanied by a corresponding improvement in investigative effectiveness, except, perhaps in the most visible but relatively infrequent situations. Thus, while technology is playing an increasingly influential role in the criminal investigation process, it for the most part remains supportive of and reliant upon the relationship between the public and the police in solving crime (Horvath, Meesig, & Lee, 2001: 8).

Thus the search for improved investigations has always relied on the relationship between police officers, victims and offenders, with detectives seeing their pivotal role as managing the relationship between police and offenders, a relationship that revolves around information gleaned through interviews with arrested suspects and confidential informant handling. While operational security has often been cited as the reason for keeping information secret, the simple reality is that personal advancement is usually the reason, as information can often be translated into arrests – and a good arrest record can be translated into personal success. For example, arrests were for many years in the Metropolitan Police the primary way to advance within the detective ranks. Officers who were aides to the Criminal Investigation Department could demonstrate their worth and in doing so earn a place on a CID course, and so become a detective (Grieve, 2004).

Respect was therefore accorded to a 'good thief-taker' or a cop who had a nose for nicking villains. In patrol cars, canteens and offices across the land, respect fell to those that knew the streets, had a feel for villainy, and who had a snout or two who could tell them what was going on. As Flood notes (at least in relation to the UK);

By and large, intelligence gathering from the 1960s onwards was more art than science with most collection capability consisting of the use of informants whose exploitation was usually immediate and sometimes dependant upon the personal insights, priorities and personal determination of the informant handlers. Intelligence activity in most police forces had exclusively short term operational objectives (Flood, 2004: 40).

While there will always be a place for arresting prolific offenders, the emphasis on detection and the value of success in individual investigations has,

until recently, completely overshadowed the original preventative role of policing. As detectives have risen through the ranks by being able to demonstrate good police work through arrests, they have in turn reinforced the importance of an impressive arrest record as the way to advance within the sworn ranks, both by their promotion choices for junior staff and by their personal examples. In contrast, the field of crime prevention – where results are hard to prove and rarely end in arrests – has lamentably become an exile from mainstream policing for the un-ambitious, the idealistic, and the un-promotable.

A corollary of this general trend within law enforcement has meant that the emphasis on individual case investigation has tended to warp the meaning of intelligence within policing. The International Association of Law Enforcement Intelligence Analysts defines intelligence as “the product of systematic gathering, evaluation, and synthesis of raw data on individuals or activities suspected of being, or known to be, criminal in nature. Intelligence is information that has been analyzed to determine its meaning and relevance. Information is compiled, analyzed, and/or disseminated in an effort to anticipate, prevent, or monitor criminal activity.” (IALEIA, 2004: 37)¹. This definition emphasises the individual case-specific nature that is the reality of much criminal intelligence analysis. While there exists a range of application areas for criminal intelligence across an array of tactical, operational and strategic theatres (Ratcliffe, 2004), most front-line police officers simply interpret the term intelligence as synonymous with covert information. Civilian (and sworn) staff hired and paid to take covert photographs of suspects or transcribe recorded telephone conversations have been hired as ‘analysts’ to gather ‘intelligence’ though they perform no analysis and simply create covert information for detectives investigating single cases or a series of linked offences, all for the sole purpose of effecting an arrest and prosecution. This misrepresentation of the terms perpetuates the myth that if information cannot be used to crack a case, it is not intelligence. This pervasive view has remained surprisingly steadfast, even when evidence of the relative ineffectiveness of individual investigations to long-term crime reduction efforts has been documented, with some researchers expressing the view that “progress in police criminal investigative efforts remains largely isolated from broader police efforts to respond more effectively, more efficiently and more resolutely to the crime problem in general” (Horvath et al., 2001: 9).

Nowhere is this view more noticeable than in the area of strategic criminal intelligence, an area where many intelligence analysts are still required to ‘sell’ their product and work to make themselves and their wares attractive to

¹ They do however rather confuse matters by having separate definitions for *crime-pattern analysis* (a process that looks for links between crimes and other incidents to reveal similarities and differences that can be used to help predict and prevent future criminal activity), *criminal analysis* (the application of analytical methods and products to raw data that produces intelligence within the criminal justice field), and *criminal intelligence* (information compiled, analyzed, and/or disseminated in an effort to anticipate, prevent, or monitor criminal activity) (IALEIA, 2004)

decision-makers (Nicholl, 2004; Sheptycki & Ratcliffe, 2004: 196). Even though intelligence-led policing has advanced considerably in the UK, Sheptycki's review of strategic intelligence still found as notable, "the status and prestige that accrues to the detective occupation, the pre-eminence of which has inhibited intelligence-led policing by converting 'intelligence' into 'detections' " (Sheptycki, 2004b: v). Strategic intelligence is analysed information that aims to provide "insight or understanding, contributing to decisions on broad strategies, policies and resources, directed to achieving long-term organisational objectives" (ACS, 2000: 5). As such, it is hardly of interest to many front-line officers.

Unfortunately, that view still remains when some of those front-line officers become executives, perpetuating the value of traditional knowledge best used to solve cases. When commanders in three New Zealand police districts were interviewed, none of them felt that they should be the clients for crime analysis and criminal intelligence, feeling that lower ranks were more appropriate levels for that type of analysed information (Ratcliffe, 2005). It is likely that this view was based on their perception that criminal intelligence was simply an investigative tool that would be of little value in their broader role as a decision-maker.

Until recently therefore, criminal intelligence has been mislabelled as an adjunct to investigations, as a poor cousin languishing in the shadow of the detective who is still the family favourite. This even when, at least in the US, only a minority of agencies (39%) provide any training for newly appointed investigators (and when they do it is less than two weeks in duration), and only slightly more than half of police departments require their detectives to undergo refresher or additional training (Horvath et al., 2001). The old knowledge has therefore been that which is secret, case-specific, offender-focused, and locked inside the heads of detectives or good 'thief-takers'. Intelligence-led policing still recognises the value of the old knowledge, but also seeks to integrate it with new knowledge, knowledge that comes from very different sources. The next section explores these new forms of knowledge.

New knowledge

If case-specific, covert information that can be directly applied to solving investigations is the old knowledge, what then is the new knowledge? To understand the new information areas available to the police, it is helpful to look at three drivers for change: the rapid digitization in the last twenty years, a greater understanding of crime and police effectiveness in combating and reducing crime, and a new era of public accountability.

The digital age has impacted both sides of the crime equation, increasing opportunities for, and methods of, criminality while simultaneously creating opportunities for police departments to better understand patterns of crime and the bigger picture of police operations by acting as a retrievable repository of information that shrewd departments can analyse and model. Police departments have reacted to the digitisation of police record keeping with variable levels of

enthusiasm, with police chiefs ranging from the pioneering enthusiast to the downright Luddite. In many cases, the introduction of new technology has met with problems, such as the chronic obsolescence of many systems, systems which take ages to introduce, to the resistance of officers unfamiliar with new technology and fearful of the implications for assessment of competence (Ericson & Haggerty, 1997: 432-3).

Digitization of police data has however enabled a whole breed of new crime analysts to access and analyse recorded crime data, offender information and explore patterns in local crime activity. Policing was ripe for digitisation. As early as the 1920s, detectives in London's Metropolitan Police were using a card index of local thieves to target for arrest (Grieve, 2004) and as currently as the mid-1980s your current author (as a young constable) used a faded photograph glued to the back of a collator's card to identify and arrest (while off-duty no less!) a man wanted for murder in the East End of London. Card indices are still in use in many places, though have been generally replaced as the limitations of such rudimentary devices have become clear. Intelligence databases are now more often digital, searchable and national. As recently as 1985, police stations in London were using paper records to manage calls for service². Now, locally recorded police data, such as calls for service and crime reports, are digitally recorded and available for analysis by the more advanced police departments, analyses that can incorporate non-police data sources such as census data, or crime distributions from neighbouring police departments. Crime analysts, unheard of in most departments twenty years ago, are now becoming peddlers of the new knowledge, knowledge that relies less on individual knowledge gleaned about offenders, and more about offending patterns. The new knowledge is therefore less about criminals and more about crime. And it is also about the computer technical prowess required to manipulate this new, rich information source. While most officers could figure out a card index, complex searches of relational databases requires a little more digital prowess. However this knowledge would be of little value if crime was a random phenomenon. For crime patterns to be deemed 'knowledge' requires a greater understanding of crime from a theoretical perspective, and this has been provided by crime researchers and analysts, especially from the field of environmental criminology.

Greater digitization has increased the flow of raw information available to crime researchers interested in patterns of crime and the range of possible responses. In the last thirty years, environmental criminology has grown to be a

² When I arrived in 1985 at Bow Road Police Station (H District in Tower Hamlets) in East London, the command and control centre was a converted corridor with antiquated equipment and a rudimentary telephone system. Calls from the public were recorded on a message pad and stored on a two-pronged holder. To prevent messages falling off the holder, the prongs were secured at the top by an elastic band. When the public rang the emergency 999 number, the call was answered at New Scotland Yard, and the details forwarded to Bow via a telex printer that was kept in a cupboard. When an emergency call was received, a little bell rang inside the printer to signify the urgency of the message!

substantial field within its own right. Environmental criminology, and related approaches such as crime science (see for example Laycock, 2001), worries less about the causes that lead an individual to engage in a life of crime, and is more concerned with the dynamics of the crime event itself and what conditions of the crime target or local environment can be ameliorated to prevent repetition. In this way, environmental criminology demonstrates significant differences in philosophical approach to mainstream criminology (Clarke, 2004). This more practical focus has led to a wealth of knowledge about spatial and temporal patterns of crime over the last couple of decades. For example, environmental criminologists have mapped the extent of routine activity theory (Cohen & Felson, 1979; Felson, 1998), the rational choice perspective (Clarke & Felson, 1993; Cornish & Clarke, 1986) and crime pattern theory (Brantingham & Brantingham, 1993a, 1993b) to arrive at a range of practical crime-reduction and detection tactics. Such tactics include situational crime prevention (Brantingham & Brantingham, 1990; Clarke, 1997; Newman, 1997), geographic profiling (Canter, Coffey, Huntley, & Missen, 2000; Rossmo, 2000), and a body of knowledge about reducing crime at specific places (for a good summary see Eck, 1998). Many of these strategies are woven together under the banner of problem-oriented policing (Braga et al., 1999; Goldstein, 1990; Leigh, Read, & Tilley, 1996; Leigh, Read, & Tilley, 1998; Skogan, 1996). What differentiates problem-oriented policing from a more traditional approach to law enforcement is the emphasis on long-term problem solving, requiring a different type of analysis and a more strategic view of the use of information.

This growing need for strategic information has added value to the new knowledge provided by crime analysts. The information created by well-trained crime analysts has therefore become valuable as a result of a growth of work that explains how crimes are committed. Where crime analysts have value and their knowledge is prized is, in part, due to the work of environmental criminologists and crime scientists. It is also in part due to the need for police departments to better account for their activities, a role that mainstream criminology could never fulfil.

It is probable that the increased enthusiasm to make the police more accountable is a direct result of greater digitization of police data. It was always difficult to hold police accountable when there were no benchmarks or measures of their activity. That time has now gone forever. Research suggests that much of the data recorded by police is not used by the police but is now provided to external institutions (Ericson & Haggerty, 1997). Some of these institutions have an oversight role over policing, and the provision of data in the new information-rich world of the digital age has created a huge accountability industry in the policing arena. The push for accountability within a framework of what was described as a general trend towards a new type of public management (Crawford, 1997) left police managers struggling to manage the range of areas to which they were deemed responsible (Fleming & Lafferty, 2000; Serpas, 2004; Sheptycki, 2002).

DRAFT

All of this has driven the creation of a new type of analyst, one who rarely leaves the police station, who rarely (if ever) has contact with offenders, who is often regarded as a second-class citizen of the police world, yet is one who is the gatekeeper to new knowledge about police activity and an essential part of the measurement of police success in a risk-adverse environment.

In this context, I therefore define the new knowledge as that which relates to information about crime events, patterns and themes that run through what can initially appear to be random events, and is knowledge that is more relevant to resource management and operational priorities than case support and individual investigations. The skills and types of analyses that can explore these broader patterns are very different to the skills necessary to collect the traditional wisdom. Crime-centric knowledge requires computer dexterity, analytical ability, database management and reporting skills, and can be conducted largely in an office environment. In many respects, this all runs as an anathema to the traditional, offender-centric knowledge that recognised skill in manipulating and managing informants, and respected knowledge based on a long history working in one area and getting to know the characters and offenders in that geographical region.

Prior to intelligence-led policing, the new knowledge was central to the development of both problem-oriented policing and CompStat. Problem-oriented policing requires police agencies to analyse new knowledge in order to scan for problems, analyse the problems, and to assess the results of police attempts to reduce crime (Eck & Spelman, 1987; Scott, 2000) while CompStat uses digital crime data almost exclusively in order to create a management accountability process (McGuire, 2000; Serpas, 2004; Walsh, 2001; Willis, Mastrofski, Weisburd, & Greenspan, 2003). However the success of the new knowledge in these environments has not been as great as some have hoped. Problem-oriented policing is still to become a mainstream police activity irrespective of the high levels of adoption from a few police forces (Scott, 2000) and while CompStat has grown to, if not mainstream status then certainly celebrity status in the US (Firman, 2003), little is yet known about its effectiveness for crime reduction (Moore, 2003). The mapping component of CompStat meetings is often rudimentary and point-focused, such that while CompStat does use new technology and data sources recorded digitally, it often does so in a tactical manner, eschewing more long-term strategic goals in favour of ameliorating patterns of dots rather than exploring long-term problems.

Intelligence-led policing is an attempt to unite new and old knowledge. To fully understand the development of intelligence-led policing and its aim of combining a general understanding of crime problems with information on recidivist offenders and central players in the criminal milieu, it is helpful to have an impression of how information-led initiatives have led us to the current situation.

Intelligence-led policing: the best of both worlds?

Intelligence-led policing did not appear from thin air. A number of different paradigms preceded intelligence-led policing, as already stated. For example, the community policing paradigm that swept US policing in the 1980s and 1990s provided a fertile ground for a more information-driven approach to community safety. Although community policing is a rather protean concept within law enforcement, it can be summarised as a philosophy and strategy that seeks to increase the level of contact between the police and the local population. Ideally, contact with the public is directed towards operational priorities that are dictated through an increased information processing requirement on the part of the police. What separates this information processing requirement from the information demands of previous eras is the requirement to analyze 'information from domains that had previously been either ignored or neglected' (O'Shea & Nicholls, 2002: 2). As such, police are required to identify and correct 'problems' in the community, and the requirement to identify problems has been a driving force for increased information processing, not just within community policing, but also with the growth of problem-oriented policing.

Along with the Broken Windows hypothesis of Wilson and Kelling (1982), Herman Goldstein's problem-oriented policing philosophy (Goldstein, 1990) has been credited with 'discovering' community policing (Oliver & Bartgis, 1998). Problem-oriented policing has a significant information-processing requirement, especially at the scanning, analysis and assessment stages of the methodology, as commonly defined with the SARA method (Eck & Spelman, 1987). Problem-oriented policing places a significant responsibility on crime analysis to drive the problem identification and response evaluation process. However, problem-oriented policing, while growing in popularity, has so far failed to achieve the status of mainstream practice in both the UK (Townesley, Johnson, & Pease, 2003) and the US (Scott, 2000). One cause of the slow diffusion of problem-oriented policing has been the lack of suitably-trained crime analysts to assist with both problem-oriented policing and intelligence-led policing (Clarke, 2004).

Intelligence-led policing grew in the UK in the wake of two influence government reports by the Audit Commission (Audit Commission, 1993) and the Home Office (HMIC, 1997). These reports lamented the reactive focus of British police and sought to shift this focus to a more proactive stance that focused more on the criminal than the crime. This drove the development of a policing strategy (intelligence-led policing) that concentrated on the use of informants and intelligence analysis to identify problem areas and recidivist offenders (Christopher, 2004). The conceptual framework of intelligence-led policing is now enshrined in the UK National Intelligence Model (NIM), a business plan for police that concentrates on targeting offenders, the management of crime and disorder hotspots, the investigate linked crimes and incidents (series), and the application of a range of preventative measures (Flood, 2004; NCIS, 2000).

As Brodeur and Dupont (2006) argue, intelligence-led policing also grew from the development of information as a fundamental resource in policing, and the realisation (probably a reluctant one on the part of some police officers) that policing is a networked activity, where there are many participants, both within and without the uniform branch, who contribute to law and order. This network has always been recognised by intelligence analysts who have relied on informal networks to provide the information snippets that were often held up in bureaucratic information bottlenecks, inter-agency turf wars, or the myriad other ways that vital information is not communicated. Indeed, while a strength of the law enforcement intelligence world has been the way that informal information mechanisms have often filled the breach when formal approaches to information sharing failed, this resulted in an unintended consequence when police services attempted to formalize intelligence-led policing. In the UK, this has occurred through the introduction of the NIM (NCIS, 2000). Prior to the NIM, the use of informal information transfer systems had negated the need for formal systems, and once the NIM was introduced, there were a number of teething problems, some of which may be attributable to the imposition of a formal structure on what had, for many years, been a relatively informal business. Suddenly there were formal reporting mechanisms and organizational collaborations to be structured and quantified, yet all of this was being imposed on a policing system that was unfamiliar with the subtleties of the underlying constructs of intelligence, existing as it was in an intelligence 'lacuna' (Christopher, 2004).

The NIM holds out the promise of a more objective, problem solving focused approach to policing problems, and has grown to have a broader mandate than just the 'high' policing functions of regional and international organised crime threats (Oakensen, Mockford, & Pascoe, 2002; Tilley, 2003). With the inclusion of volume crime as a key target of the NIM from the start, the opportunity to integrate the new knowledge with a resurgent interest in the old (intelligence-based) knowledge has held out the panacea of an integrated, objective analysis of the criminal environment driving policing priorities. The next section considers whether this promise has been fulfilled.

Knowledge-rich or just information-rich?

The challenges facing an integration of criminal intelligence and crime analysis – the old and the new – are not insignificant. Even though recent publications emanating from the Home Office suggest that there will be a premium on intelligence and expertise in the policing environment of the future (HMIC, 2005), there are challenges that are technological, organizational and cultural (Ratcliffe, in press).

Technological concerns

Attempts to move forward with an integration of new and old knowledge are running into significant technological barriers, due to a degree of incompatibility of the types of information required to feed the knowledge structures. Crime analysis is inherently spatial with a near one-to-one

DRAFT

relationship between crimes and locations. Criminal intelligence is less distinct. Offenders offend in a variety of places, live at different locations – often simultaneously – and knowledge of their routine activities and patterns of offending is usually incomplete and often of variable quality. As a result, many police forces have separate computer programs to deal with these different knowledge structures. Database structures that are designed to audit one function of policing are not necessarily capable of providing useful information to another function.

For example, I was recently reminded of the dangers of assuming that police data recording practices have moved into a more crime-focused area, while I was wandering (virtually) through the databases of a local police department. While trying to gain an understanding of their data systems in order to see what information could be valuable to aid with the development of CompStat and problem-oriented policing, I found data fields called 'incident start date/time' and 'incident end date/time'. Having worked with many police departments that use these fields to record crime start and end times, such as when a house was known to be safe and then later discovered burgled, I assumed that these fields were the same and could be useful for crime and problem analysis. In making my assumption I failed to recognise the limitations of current police data recording practices, practices that were geared towards a bureaucratic response to police work rather than a problem-solving response. The data systems reflected the preoccupation with output rather than outcome. These fields recorded when the incident was opened onto the dispatch system and when it was cleared, because these bureaucratic micro-measurements of 'performance' were more important than getting a handle on the picture of criminal activity in the area. Further inquiry discovered that the data systems did not record temporal characteristics of incidents because nobody was interested in the crime patterns and no one deemed this information worth recording. It certainly appears that greater digitization in the policing world has, rather than free police officers from 'stifling bureaucratization' (Brodeur & Dupont, 2006: 12), simply replaced the often meaningless paper form with an often meaningless electronic form. And I suspect the latter will continue to grow, against our best efforts.

"If Government policy relating to increasing police officers without an appropriate knowledge creation infrastructure continues, the situation in relation to knowledge management improvement within the police service does not augur well for the future of intelligence/knowledge led policing." (Hughes & Jackson, 2004: 73)

Organizational concerns

Organizational problems can be considered to be a two-pronged problem. In the simplest terms, what is the point in expending effort to develop intelligence and analyse crime patterns if police forces do not have the capability and personnel necessary to capitalise on the advantage that knowledge-driven

policing is supposed to give them? In a recent Home Office review of UK police forces, the ability of the police to respond to criminal intelligence-driven initiatives was found to be hamstrung by organizational limitations:

The response to serious and organised crime suffered in many places simply because there were not enough resources and specialist support to act upon the intelligence gathered. The strength of the public order domain was dependent upon the experience and exposure of the force, as well as capacity issues (HMIC, 2005: 7).

Secondly, even if resources are available, what is the point if there is no requirement or organizational enthusiasm to steer output to a more intelligence-driven operational plan? These questions currently plague attempts by analysts to take a greater role in driving the direction of police forces, attempts that are largely dependent on the individual leadership and support of commanders at the local level.

Cope's (2004) research in two police forces is particularly illuminating of this issues. The lack of policing experience of many crime analysts was an issue for sworn officers who were unwilling to accept recommendations for action from non-police personnel, and many analytical products were simply ignored by operational police. Furthermore, the "paucity of training on analysis affects police officers ability to ask the right questions of analysts in order to ensure the products are useful operationally" (p.194). These are but a few of the organizational problems that suggest moving forward with analysis as the dominant knowledge tool for decision-making is likely to be a slow process with no guarantee of success. Sheptycki's (2004b) review of strategic intelligence capacity in British policing identifies no fewer than twelve organizational problems that inhibit the advancement of criminal intelligence in a multi-agency setting.

Cultural concerns

The power of police culture as an inhibiting influence on change is almost legendary, and has the potential to leave an integrated analytical model in a cachectic state. As Herman Goldstein noted, "Police departments have a life of their own. Powerful forces within the police establishment have a much stronger influence over the way in which a police agency operates than do the managers of the department, legislatures and courts, the mayor, and the members of the community" (Goldstein, 1990: 29). One of the more significant effects of these forces within policing is a long-held mistrust of civilians by their sworn colleagues.

This exacerbates the existing problem of recognition of crime analysts, by compounding it through the placement of civilians into the role. In effect, crime analysis suffers a double-whammy of being both a new discipline as well as a

(usually) civilian one. However even when analysts are not civilian, they still experience problems surrounding the issue of intelligence sharing within their organisation. These intra-agency occupational subcultures (Sheptycki, 2004a) work counter to the sharing ambitions of intelligence-led policing. While the organizational issues may be overcome, this lack of willingness to share intelligence is clearly a cultural issue, and is one that most police agencies have either ignored or to which have been unable to find a solution. Sometimes the withholding of information with analysts is not from any malicious desire to limit information flowing to the centre, but is more simply due to a lack of recognition that the information the officer possesses is worth passing on. The vicious cycle of officers not passing on information is returned to them as a lack of intelligence provision. As they feel that they do not get anything from the intelligence analyst, they don't bother passing information on, and the cycle continues. And there is no reason for the cycle to stop, given that many officers feel that the intelligence arm of the service tells them things they already know...

Crime prevention initiatives are only as effective as the accuracy of the analysis on which they are based. In other words, proper understanding of the problem is vital. This will not occur when police officers persuade themselves that they understand more about a problem than they really do ...The 'I know best' syndrome is a trait prevalent in all officer ranks (Townesley et al., 2003: 192).

A desire to seek longer-term solutions to crime problems than simply palliative arrests is an aim of intelligence-led policing, one that is shared with problem-oriented policing. It is possible that this desire has not been sufficiently articulated to rank-and-file officers, and that perhaps greater direction and leadership will allow this to become more of a corporate direction for the police service. This is to be hoped for, but don't hold your breath. Such a dramatic change as is probably required would be a significant innovation, and a lack of support for innovation (in reality a resistance to change even when current practices are not working) does tend to characterise many police organisations – a point recognised by Cope: “Poor problem-oriented approaches, poor analytical thinking and a culture that does not support innovation, alongside fragmentation, occupational divides, media and public expectations all contribute to the lack of integration of knowledge into practice” (Cope, 2004: 196). It is possible that these issues are more prevalent with new knowledge rather than old knowledge, largely because of the source and delivery of that knowledge. Cops still favour knowledge that comes from other cops.

An uphill struggle

Publicly, information sharing has become the lynchpin of law enforcement's effort to reduce crime and prevent future terrorist attacks within the United States. To a considerable degree, this enthusiasm for the principles of

DRAFT

information and intelligence sharing stems from within law enforcement, and is supported by state and federal government. In early 2002, law enforcement executives and intelligence experts met in Toronto, Canada, at the International Association of Chiefs of Police (IACP) Criminal Intelligence Sharing Summit. There they called for the creation of a nationally coordinated criminal intelligence council so that the country could develop a national intelligence plan. This resulted in the creation of a Global Intelligence Working Group, who wrote the National Criminal Intelligence Sharing Plan [NCISP] (GIWG, 2003). The plan, supported by President Bush and endorsed by the Department of Justice, is a central tenet of US law enforcement in the 21st Century: “The plan is the outcome of an unprecedented effort by law enforcement agencies, with the strong support of the Department of Justice, to strengthen the nation’s security through better intelligence analysis and sharing.” (Attorney General John Ashcroft, May 14, 2004).

The Global Intelligence Working Group promoted their vision of the National Criminal Intelligence Sharing Plan’s relevance to police at all levels of American law enforcement. In this vision (GIWG, 2003: iv), they noted that the plan should be (among other things):

- A mechanism to promote intelligence-led policing.
- A technology architecture to provide secure, seamless sharing of information among systems.
- A plan that leverages existing systems and networks, yet allows flexibility for technology and process enhancements.

While it is laudable to promote intelligence-led policing, in terms of information sharing, the NCISP recognises that challenges existed. The first recommendation of the plan was that “the agency chief executive officer and the manager of intelligence functions should seek ways to enhance intelligence sharing efforts and foster information sharing by participating in task forces and state, regional, and federal information sharing initiatives” (GIWG, 2003: vi). Yet information sharing initiatives run counter to much of the existing culture within law enforcement, a culture that recognizes knowledge is power and retention of information gives an individual (or organization) power within the community of law enforcement agencies. Information sharing does not necessarily result in an equal transfer of knowledge. The aim of utilising ‘existing systems and networks’ fails to recognise that existing networks survive due to the mutual benefit inherent in the arrangement. The “pay-to-play” or “give-to-get” principle is “a widely understood, unwritten rule... the expectation in law enforcement that data access and sharing hinge on equitable participation” (GIWG, 2003: 18) and a recognition of this is written into the plan. However an equitable sharing of knowledge may not be a realistic proposal. After all, if information-sharing was regularly equal and beneficial to both sides, surely we should have seen more of it, making the plan redundant?

DRAFT

Articulating support for intelligence sharing has become the Zeitgeist of our times, however articulation of intelligence sharing principles and active participation and sharing are not the same thing. Intelligence-led policing is attempting to synchronise two different types of knowledge (old and new) that are, on the surface, fairly mismatched, and is attempting to do so in order to create intelligence products that go beyond the existing arrest mentality and into preventative areas that are incompatible with the subculture of current policing. The challenges are significant.

It is yet unclear whether intelligence-led policing will completely rescue the role of intelligence from “over 150 years in the murky backwaters of policing” (Christopher, 2004: 179). It may be that the route to an integration of crime analysis and criminal intelligence is anfractuous at best. It may be that intelligence-led policing does not survive in its current form. Policing is beset by fads, and there is evidence in the UK that the police are moving away from a single intelligence focus towards a more community-oriented ‘reassurance’ model (Maguire & John, 2006). Maguire and John may be right when they argue that the NIM can survive the move to a more neighbourhood type model of policing, and that the retention of the NIM might provide a more objective framework to future changes in policing priorities. However the time will inevitably come when there is conflict between community concerns and the evidence from objective crime and intelligence analysis. If the priorities of the former are taken over the latter, then the NIM may continue to be a business model for policing, but it may cease to be an intelligence-led model. The provision of information to the community may take on an even greater role in the knowledge management practices of police services, and if that is the case, it may herald the dominance of the new knowledge over the old knowledge, with criminal intelligence slinking back off into the murky backwaters of policing, and crime analysis expanding its client base to include as many customers out of uniform as in uniform.

References

- ACS. (2000). *Intelligence Doctrine*. Canberra: Australian Customs Service.
- Audit Commission. (1993). *Helping With Enquiries: Tackling Crime Effectively* (Management handbook). London: HMSO.
- Braga, A. A., Weisburd, D. L., Waring, E. J., Mazerolle, L. G., Spelman, W., & Gajewski, F. (1999). Problem-oriented policing in violent crime places: A randomized control experiment. *Criminology*, 37(3), 541-580.
- Brantingham, P. L., & Brantingham, P. J. (1990). Situational crime prevention in practice. *Canadian Journal of Criminology*, 32(1), 17-40.
- Brantingham, P. L., & Brantingham, P. J. (1993a). Environment, routine, and situation: Toward a pattern theory of crime. In R. V. Clarke & M. Felson (Eds.), *Routine Activity and Rational Choice* (Vol. 5, pp. 259-294). New Brunswick: Transaction publishers.
- Brantingham, P. L., & Brantingham, P. J. (1993b). Nodes, paths and edges: Considerations on the complexity of crime and the physical environment. *Environmental Psychology*, 13, 3-28.
- Brodeur, J.-P. (1983). High Policing and Low Policing: Remarks about the policing of political activities. *Social Problems*, 30(5), 507-520.
- Brodeur, J.-P., & Dupont, B. (2006). Knowledge Workers or "Knowledge" Workers? *Policing and Society*, 16(1), 7-26.
- Canter, D., Coffey, T., Huntley, M., & Missen, C. (2000). Predicting serial killers' home base using a decision support system. *Quantitative Criminology*, 16(4), 457-478.
- Christopher, S. (2004). A practitioner's perspective of UK strategic intelligence. In J. H. Ratcliffe (Ed.), *Strategic Thinking in Criminal Intelligence* (First ed.). Sydney: Federation Press.
- Clarke, R. (Ed.). (1997). *Situational Crime Prevention: Successful Case Studies* (2nd ed.). Albany, NY: Harrow and Heston.
- Clarke, R. V. (2004). Technology, criminology and crime science. *European Journal on Criminal Policy and Research*, 10(1), 55-63.
- Clarke, R. V., & Felson, M. (1993). Introduction: Criminology, routine activity, and rational choice. In R. V. Clarke & M. Felson (Eds.), *Routine Activity and Rational Choice* (Vol. 5, pp. 259-294). New Brunswick: Transaction publishers.
- Cohen, L. E., & Felson, M. (1979). Social change and crime rate trends: A routine activity approach. *American Sociological Review*, 44, 588-608.
- Cope, N. (2004). Intelligence led policing or policing led intelligence?: Integrating volume crime analysis into policing. *British Journal of Criminology*, 44(2), 188-203.
- Cornish, D., & Clarke, R. (1986). *The Reasoning Criminal: Rational Choice Perspectives on Offending*. New York: Springer-Verlag.
- Crawford, A. (1997). *The local governance of crime: appeals to community and partnerships*. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
- Eck, J. (1998). *Preventing crime at places (Chapter 7)* (Preventing Crime: What works, what doesn't, what's promising). Washington DC: National Institute of Justice.
- Eck, J. E., & Spelman, W. (1987). *Problem solving: Problem-oriented policing in Newport News*. Washington DC: Police Executive Research Forum.
- Ericson, R. V., & Haggerty, K. D. (1997). *Policing the risk society*. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
- Felson, M. (1998). *Crime and everyday life: Impact and implications for society* (Second ed.). Thousand Oaks, California: Pine Forge Press.

- Firman, J. R. (2003). Deconstructing CompStat to clarify its intent. *Criminology and Public Policy*, 2(3), 457-460.
- Fleming, J., & Lafferty, G. (2000). New management techniques and restructuring for accountability in Australian police organisations. *Policing: An International Journal of Police Strategies & Management*, 23(2), 154-168.
- Flood, B. (2004). Strategic aspects of the UK National Intelligence Model. In J. H. Ratcliffe (Ed.), *Strategic Thinking in Criminal Intelligence* (First ed., pp. 37-52). Sydney: Federation Press.
- GIWG. (2003). *The National Criminal Intelligence Sharing Plan*. Washington DC: Department of Justice (Global Intelligence Working Group).
- Goldstein, H. (1990). *Problem-Oriented Policing*. New York: McGraw-Hill.
- Grieve, J. (2004). Developments in UK criminal intelligence. In J. H. Ratcliffe (Ed.), *Strategic Thinking in Criminal Intelligence* (First ed., pp. 25-36). Sydney: Federation Press.
- HMIC. (1997). *Policing with intelligence* (Thematic inspection on good practice). London: Her Majesty's Inspectorate of Constabulary.
- HMIC. (2005). *Closing the gap*. London: Her Majesty's Inspectorate of Constabulary.
- Horvath, F., Meesig, R. T., & Lee, Y. H. (2001). *National Survey of Police Policies and Practices Regarding the Criminal Investigations Process: Twenty-Five Years After Rand* (Final report NCJRS 202902). Washington DC: National Institute of Justice.
- Hughes, V., & Jackson, P. (2004). The influence of technical, social and structural factors on the effective use of Information in a policing environment. *The Electronic Journal of Knowledge Management*, 2(1), 65-76.
- IALEIA. (2004). *Law Enforcement Analytic Standards*. Richmond, VA: Global Justice Information Sharing Initiative.
- Laycock, G. (2001). Scientists or politicians - who has the answer to crime? Inaugural lecture of the Jill Dando Institute of Crime Science.
- Leigh, A., Read, T., & Tilley, N. (1996). Problem-Oriented Policing. *Police Research Group: Crime Detection and Prevention Series, Paper 75*, 62.
- Leigh, A., Read, T., & Tilley, N. (1998). Brit Pop II: Problem-orientated policing in practice. *Police Research Group: Police Research Series, Paper 93*, 60.
- Maguire, M., & John, T. (2006). Intelligence led policing, managerialism and community engagement: Competing priorities and the role of the National Intelligence Model in the UK. *Policing and Society*, 16(1), 67-85.
- Mayne, S. R. (1829). *Instructions and Orders*. London: Metropolitan Police.
- McGuire, P. G. (2000). The New York Police Department COMPSTAT Process. In V. Goldsmith & P. G. McGuire & J. H. Mollenkopf & T. A. Ross (Eds.), *Analyzing Crime Patterns: Frontiers of Practice* (pp. 11-22). Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage.
- Moore, M. H. (2003). Sizing up CompStat: An important administrative innovation in policing. *Criminology and Public Policy*, 2(3), 469-494.
- NCIS. (2000). *The National Intelligence Model*. London: National Criminal Intelligence Service.
- Newman, G. (1997). Introduction: Towards a theory of situational crime prevention. In G. Newman & R. Clarke & S. G. Shoham (Eds.), *Rational Choice and Situational Crime Prevention: Theoretical Foundations* (pp. 1-23). Dartmouth, UK: Ashgate.
- Nicholl, J. (2004). Task definition. In J. H. Ratcliffe (Ed.), *Strategic Thinking in Criminal Intelligence* (pp. 53-69). Sydney: Federation Press.
- Oakensen, D., Mockford, R., & Pascoe, C. (2002). Does there have to be blood on the carpet? Integrating partnership, problem-solving and the National Intelligence

- Model in strategic and tactical police decision-making processes. *Police Research and Management*, 5(4), 51-62.
- Oliver, W. M., & Bartgis, E. (1998). Community policing: a conceptual framework. *Policing: An International Journal of Police Strategies & Management*, 21(3), 490-509.
- O'Shea, T. C., & Nicholls, K. (2002). *Crime Analysis in America* (Full final report). Washington DC: Office of Community Oriented Policing Services.
- Ratcliffe, J. H. (2004). *Strategic Thinking in Criminal Intelligence*. Sydney: Federation Press.
- Ratcliffe, J. H. (2005). The effectiveness of police intelligence management: A New Zealand case study. *Police Practice and Research*, 6(5), 435-451.
- Ratcliffe, J. H. (in press). *Integrated intelligence and crime analysis: A new approach to problem solving for law enforcement leaders*. Washington DC: Police Foundation.
- Ross, N. (2005, 22 October 2005). *Higher up the food chain: putting cops where they belong*. Paper presented at the Problem Oriented Policing conference, Charlotte, NC.
- Rossmo, D. K. (2000). *Geographic Profiling*. Boca Raton, FL: CRC Press.
- Scott, M. S. (2000). *Problem-Oriented Policing: Reflections on the First 20 Years*. Washington DC: COPS Office.
- Serpas, R. W. (2004). Beyond CompStat: Accountability-Driven Leadership. *Police Chief*, 71(1), 24, 29 to 31.
- Sheptycki, J. (2002). Accountability across the policing field: Towards a general cartography of accountability for post-modern policing. *Policing and Society*, 12(4), 323-338.
- Sheptycki, J. (2004a). Organizational pathologies in police intelligence systems: Some contributions to the lexicon of intelligence-led policing. *European Journal of Criminology*, 1(3), 307-332.
- Sheptycki, J. (2004b). *Review of the influence of strategic intelligence on organised crime policy and practice* (Special Interest Series Paper 14). London: Home Office Research and Statistics Directorate.
- Sheptycki, J., & Ratcliffe, J. H. (2004). Setting the strategic agenda. In J. H. Ratcliffe (Ed.), *Strategic Thinking in Criminal Intelligence* (pp. 194-216). Sydney: Federation Press.
- Skogan, W. G. (1996). *Problem Oriented Policing in Chicago*. Paper presented at the Conference on Problem-Oriented Policing as Crime Prevention, Stockholm.
- Tilley, N. (2003). *Problem-Oriented Policing, Intelligence-Led Policing and the National Intelligence Model* (Crime Science: Short Report Series). London: Jill Dando Institute for Crime Science.
- Townsley, M., Johnson, S., & Pease, K. (2003). Problem orientation, problem solving and organizational change. *Crime Prevention Series* (Vol. 15, pp. 183-212). Monsey, NY: Criminal Justice Press.
- Walsh, W. F. (2001). Compstat: an analysis of an emerging police managerial paradigm. *Policing: An International Journal of Police Strategies & Management*, 24(3), 347-362.
- Willis, J. J., Mastrofski, S. D., Weisburd, D., & Greenspan, R. (2003). *Compstat and Organizational Change in the Lowell Police Department: Challenges and Opportunities*. Washington DC: Police Foundation.
- Wilson, J. Q., & Kelling, G. L. (1982, March 1982). Broken Windows: The police and neighborhood safety. *The Atlantic Monthly*, 29-38.