

Intelligence-led policing: Anticipating risk and influencing action

Jerry H. Ratcliffe, PhD

DRAFT OF FORTHCOMING CHAPTER TO BE PUBLISHED BY IALEIA – THE INTERNATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF LAW ENFORCEMENT INTELLIGENCE ANALYSTS.
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Introduction

Intelligence work is often characterized as primarily an analysis function, a covert activity, or about knowledge work. None of these views is entirely accurate. Intelligence work is primarily about anticipating risks and improving public safety. As the chief architects of Britain's National Intelligence Model have recently written, "we knew that the intelligence model was in fact an ideal model for the whole business of policing that would enable police commanders to understand and *anticipate* risks and threats across the public safety domain" (Flood and Gaspar 2009: 54, emphasis added). The role of intelligence, at least within the law enforcement domain under discussion in this chapter, is thus a dual role of *anticipating* future risks to public safety, and *influencing* decision-makers so that crime prevention action can be initiated. It is worth noting that the subject of this chapter is not intelligence, but intelligence-led *policing*. Intelligence-led policing is a contemporary model for situating the intelligence function within the overall mission of the police organization (Carter 2005). The dual role of anticipating risks and influencing action integrates analysis with decision-making and creates additional challenges for intelligence professionals. Taking on the mantle of a more direct responsibility for public safety may make some analysts uncomfortable; however it expands the role of analysis beyond a simple adjunct to policing and into a core function central to decision-making

and the planning of public safety. It is a challenge that should be embraced.

This chapter begins by explaining the need within policing to manage future risks and why the role of the analyst within this is to identify patterns of criminality to aid future crime prevention action. This all takes place within a framework of intelligence-led policing (ILP), and the chapter continues by defining and describing two models. One is a simple conceptual model of intelligence-led policing, and the second is a business model that has emerged from best practice in a police department that has many years experience with partnership models of ILP. The chapter concludes by summarizing the main points so that the reader can develop ILP principles into ILP practice.

The need to manage an uncertain future

The first stage of the dual role outlined in the introduction to this chapter (anticipating risk, influencing action) is the anticipation of risks to public safety. All intelligence analysis, even descriptive work of past criminal activity, makes an implicit projection of a possible future criminal environment. For this statement to be true, we have to sometimes exclude one area of activity often mislabeled as intelligence analysis; that of investigative support. Transcribing wiretaps and other work that supports investigations with the aim of gathering sufficient evidence to sustain a prosecution is undoubtedly worthy and valuable

work, but it should be more accurately described as an investigative support function rather than intelligence work, irrespective of any job descriptions and titles of the individuals involved (Ratcliffe 2008a; Sheptycki 2004). This caveat in place, the activity of most crime and intelligence analysts implicitly attempts to use existing knowledge to project an image of an uncertain future. I say implicitly, because many analysts are happy to report existing crime patterns and criminal activity and make no statement of the future; however, a prediction of the future is often what decision-makers crave in their role as risk managers with responsibility to manage resource allocation.

Police commanders frequently ask the impossible. While often unable to articulate what they seek, they habitually seek 'the answer' - an unfeasible projection of the specific date, time and place of a future criminal act. Provision of anything less is deemed failure. In reality, aiming to predict an individual crime event would be better replaced by the objective of predicting future criminal patterns in order to be preventative rather than reactive. As I have explained elsewhere (Ratcliffe 2008a), the move to intelligence-led policing was in part driven by the desire for policing to be proactive in preventing crime instead of simply reactive to crime once it occurred. For *prevention* activity to occur, this requires that the police and crime prevention practitioners are proactive in their actions. *Proactivity* requires the criminality in question to have a component of *predictability* about it. If a crime is extremely rare we are unlikely to be able to identify future events because we require historical patterns to establish a trend and the conditions that make the event likely. Therefore *predictability* requires the identification of *patterns* of criminality. This chain (*Prevention* requires *Proactivity* requires *Predictability* requires *Patterns*) shown in Figure 1 ties the identification of patterns as a precursor to crime prevention action and is at the heart of intelligence-led policing (see Ratcliffe 2009). While some short term fluctuations sometimes exist, many crime trends and problems are long-

term and ongoing until effective remedial action is taken.




Figure 1. From patterns to prevention.
Source: Ratcliffe (2009), reproduced with permission of Federation Press (Australia).

For example, most of the Philadelphia crime hotspots mapped by researchers in the 1940s (Shaw and McKay 1942) are the same problem areas that exist today. Once crime problems emerge, they linger until resolved; when organized crime groups identify a weakness they can exploit, they continue until some sort of disturbing influence is introduced; once offenders learn how to steal a particular model of vehicle, a redesign of the vehicle is often necessary; and once burglars identify a way to circumvent a security feature, they will continue to steal until new prevention mechanisms are implemented. The importance of patterns is inherent in what I call my first law of intelligence: *The most reliable indication of future criminal activity is current criminal activity.* Offenders who have identified and exploited an opportunity will continue to do so until stopped, and that frequent criminal action will result in patterns of events. The strategic management of crime patterns will be a more effective use of enforcement energies than individual event investigations.

What does all this mean? It means that in the analytical role, the identification of patterns is essential to proactive police work geared towards

crime prevention. As stated above, even descriptive analyses of past crime patterns make a comment about the future, because there is an implied suggestion that past events are indicative of future criminality. There is also the implication that some continuation of the observed patterns will continue unless action is taken. Intelligence work is therefore a statement of an uncertain future, based on an often incomplete image of the present, with the aim of directing *future* police and crime prevention action. The analytical challenges are significant.

The second stage of the dual role (anticipating risk, influencing action) is also vital within ILP; that of influencing decision-makers. Here I invoke my second law of intelligence: *intelligence that does not influence the thinking of a decision-maker is not intelligence*. This is not to denigrate the value of investigative support, background reading, or other valuable work conducted by analysts, but simply as confirmation that intelligence is “knowledge designed for action” (Grieve 2009: 29). If we are to use knowledge to drive action, then intelligence must influence decision-makers in a meaningful manner, and this means changing or initiating a course of action. The influencing of a decision-maker to take no action is even acceptable within this framework and almost inevitable given the role of crime intelligence as a pivotal tool in resource allocation: there are rarely sufficient resources to tackle all criminality. As such, *benign neglect* is a form of action, if it is taken deliberately and done such that other priorities are given explicit priority. But *meaningful* action occurs when decisions are evidence-based and intelligence-led, where the intelligence drives a course of action that aims to reduce criminality and promote public safety. As Howard Atkin noted in the first edition of this book, “ILP is predicated on the effective and efficient production AND application of intelligence” (Peterson et al. 2000: 13, emphasis in original).

Asking analytical staff to take an active role in influencing decision-makers sounds Machiavellian and it is, but not necessarily in the pejorative sense. It is more a realization that if

analysts are to succeed in achieving the goal of improved public safety through ILP then they must use intelligence to drive leadership in policing. Intelligence managers and senior police staff may read this and interpret it to mean that the ability to present intelligence; to brief managers quickly, clearly and articulately; and to prepare and deliver compelling presentations and written documents are all significant skills to consider when hiring or promoting analysts. They would be right. As Mark Evans points out from his experiences as an intelligence manager in Northern Ireland and New Zealand, “The best analysts have presence, engage in effective verbal and non-verbal behaviour, and have the ability to read a situation and tailor their contribution accordingly. While these may be qualities that appear intangible they can be practiced and when used successfully will contribute to the impact made” (Evans 2009: 198).

If the analytical task is to minimize uncertainty so that decision-makers are able to make wise decisions regarding prevention activity and resource allocation, what is intelligence-led policing and how is it a framework for the successful achievement of the dual role of anticipating risk and influencing action?

What is intelligence-led policing?

In a previous work, I dedicated a whole chapter to defining intelligence-led policing and providing some conceptual daylight between intelligence-led policing and Compstat, community policing, and problem-oriented policing (Ratcliffe 2008a). Space precludes that option here; however the definition is as follows:

Intelligence-led policing is a business model and managerial philosophy where data analysis and crime intelligence are pivotal to an objective, decision-making framework that facilitates crime and problem reduction, disruption and prevention through both strategic management and effective enforcement strategies that target prolific and serious offenders (Ratcliffe 2008a: 89).

Intelligence-led policing is a business model and managerial philosophy... Rather than being an abstract idea to be dipped into or conceptualized in the classroom, intelligence-led policing is a philosophy of business practice that requires buy-in from all parts of the organization. Furthermore, it is a business model that prescribes, through mechanisms such as the (UK) National Intelligence Model or GMAC PBM (explained later), the way that information and crime intelligence flow around the organization to the decision-makers.

where data analysis and crime intelligence are pivotal... The term *crime intelligence* may be new to some readers. It represents a blend of crime analysis and criminal intelligence, arguing for collaboration between two strands of analysis that – in the US at least – are often kept artificially separate due to organizational, cultural or technical limitations and traditions. Crime analysis can tell a decision-maker *what* is going on, and criminal intelligence, rooted as it is in understanding and explaining patterns of criminal behavior, can tell a decision-maker *why*.

to an objective decision-making framework... This part of the definition provides real challenges for intelligence staff. What is the decision-making framework of their workplace? Where does the real power to affect change on the criminal environment lie? When analysts start asking these questions, the answer is often unexpected. Traditionally, we have sought out patrol officers, but they lack the power to control much of their own time, and often lack accountability to action intelligence. As an analyst in the New Zealand Police said, “[There is a] lack of responsibility. It is better to go through the supervisor to get *accountability*” (Ratcliffe 2005: 444).

that facilitates crime and problem reduction, disruption and prevention... As Brian Flood and Roger Gaspar pointed out in the quote at the start of this chapter, intelligence-led policing is a model for the whole business of policing. The definition therefore recognizes that it can be used for more than crime, but also the myriad

problems that police are asked to deal with, such as speeding, crash management, nuisance abatement, missing persons and public order. These risks to public safety can be anticipated with data analysis and crime intelligence and mitigated through an objective decision-making framework. When that occurs, measured responses are often more than simply arresting offenders, but include problem reduction, disruption and prevention, as recognized by the UK Serious Organised Crime Agency: “Law enforcement efforts in the UK and overseas often lead to the *disruption* and displacement of particular drug supply chains” (SOCA 2008: 7, emphasis added).

through both strategic management... There is growing evidence that problem-oriented policing’s approach of addressing the underlying causes of problems that create work for police is effective (Scott 2000; Sherman et al. 1998). The inclusion of *strategic management* in the definition is a realization that there is an important role for more long-term strategic approaches in the search for problem prevention and reduction. This inclusion in the definition enables police to work, for example, with street engineers to improve traffic accident black spots, with housing authorities to address crime and disorder in public housing projects, with city agencies to revoke alcohol licenses at disorderly bars, and with legislators to close financial loopholes exploited by organized crime syndicates.

and effective enforcement strategies that target prolific and serious offenders. While strategic management opens up possibilities for police to work with partners in a collaborative and ‘co-production’ model of crime prevention (Taylor 2006; Wood and Shearing 2007), many of the criminology-based crime control strategies of the last 30 years had no explicit role for the police: crime was to be controlled by addressing society’s underlying woes. While sociological solutions to crime all have some measure of academic merit, they often lacked policy relevance to communities and the police. There is increasing evidence that specific and targeted

policing strategies can help to reduce crime if targeted effectively. The key word here is *effective* (and evidence in support of this part of the definition is provided later in the chapter).

There is frequent confusion distinguishing between policing strategies. Intelligence-led policing is sometimes linked to community policing, Compstat and problem-oriented policing. When the definition is broken-down (as above), the daylight between intelligence-led policing and other approaches becomes apparent. For example, community policing has the primary aims of regaining the legitimacy of the police in the eyes of the public, moving towards a social service ethos, and allowing the community to take the lead in determining police priorities (Skogan 2006; Taylor 2006). By comparison, the primary aim of intelligence-led policing is the prevention of crime and arrest of prolific offenders, and it seeks a more objective decision-making system based on data and intelligence analysis to determine priorities.

Compstat is often mistaken as an intelligence-led policing methodology (see for example, Dannels and Smith 2001). Compstat is linked to both the order-maintenance practices of the NYPD that have been associated with the crime reduction that occurred in New York City in the late 1990s, and the 'broken windows' approach (Kelling 1999; Kelling and Bratton 2006; Sousa and Kelling 2006; Wilson and Kelling 1982). Compstat is largely focused on street-level and high volume crime, and drives short-term accountability to emerging crime problems, whereas intelligence-led policing has a long-term strategic component that is as applicable to transnational organized crime as it is to neighborhood disorder (Ratcliffe 2008a). As Scott and colleagues point out, Compstat has no theoretical basis on which to secure any short-term gains, and both "community policing and broken windows policing seem to be founded on the notion that community dysfunction can be quickly remedied by an injection of policing" (Scott et al. 2008: 243). Where Compstat is focused on crime, intelligence-led policing is focused on identifying threats (Carter and Carter 2009).

ILP seeks to employ a wider range of data sources than are found in any other policing style, with the possible exception of problem-oriented policing. Problem-oriented policing (POP) has a natural synergy with intelligence-led policing as both seek a more long-term, strategic, risk focused and comprehensive solution to crime. Problem-oriented policing is a conceptual approach that can address a vast array of policing issues, but it requires law enforcement to delve deeper into the underlying problems that affect public safety. This requires police to be able to scan across a range of data and information sources to identify problems, analyze these problems and identify the underlying issue, prior to addressing the problem (Clarke 2004; Eck 2006; Goldstein 2003; Townsley et al. 2003). Both POP and ILP seek a strategic solution, but intelligence-led policing is more explicit about the role of police, supporting long-term strategic management with a clear role to bring serious, repeat offenders to justice. This enables police to be proactive and anticipate risks from organized crime and serious offenders, as well as achieve the long-term public safety gains that are sought.

In summary, intelligence-led policing:

- is a management philosophy/business model;
- aims to achieve crime reduction and prevention and to disrupt offender activity;
- employs a top-down management approach;
- combines crime analysis and criminal intelligence into crime intelligence;
- uses crime intelligence to objectively direct police resource decisions;
- focuses enforcement activities on prolific and serious offenders. (Ratcliffe 2008a)

Decision-making and leadership

For intelligence-led policing to become a reality, intelligence analysis must be incorporated into the planning process of police agencies (Peterson 2005). More than this, if agencies are to anticipate risk, and influence action (the theme of

this chapter), then there are three requirements that Quarmby identifies as essential to proactive work: “there is an identifiable decision-making system to support; there is a will to think ahead in both the intelligence system and the decision system to be supported; and there is a will to apply the results in both the intelligence system and the decision system to be supported” (Quarmby 2009: 165-6). These three requirements pose some real challenges for both analysts *and* decision-makers.

A central issue for the adoption and success of intelligence-led policing is the level of sophistication and maturity of the decision-making environment. In reality, the problems are often quite profound. I’ve often been bemused by the lack of clarity regarding the decision-making process in many police departments. Mayors, police chiefs, mid-level commanders, and individual officers often appear to have free rein to make significant decisions regarding crime policy without recourse to objective analysis of the issue, or even a partial understanding or knowledge of the problem. When done in response to newspaper articles or stories on the nightly news (as appears to sometimes be the case) it is often an example of *media-led policing*. This kind of knee-jerk response to problems may have emerged as an appropriate leadership style when agencies did not have access to data, information and knowledge about the problems they faced, but it is the antithesis of intelligence-led policing.

Even when clear lines of communication and decision-making exist, they do not guarantee that decisions are strategic and evidence-based (and here the term *evidence* is used with reference to effectiveness of strategy rather than criminal evidence). For example, many police departments continue to encourage DARE (Drug Abuse Resistance Education) programs,

neighborhood block watch, and low-level drug market arrests even though it has long been known that these programs and tactics do not reduce crime (Sherman et al. 1998). As Phillips (2008: 28) points out, “All too often...commanders have a strong and sometimes sorry record of relying on their preconceptions rather than a current and measured appraisal of the problem in hand. Strong leaders can be personally effective and strategically weak”.

A business model for ILP

Once ideas of intelligence-led policing go beyond the hermetic environment of the analyst and start to look at the business of policing, then the limitations of the intelligence cycle become apparent. Other chapters in this book will examine the intelligence cycle, and it is a useful training tool to conceptualize the intelligence process for new analysts, but it does not address the problems of gaining traction with intelligence products. In effect, it says nothing to address the second law of crime intelligence: *intelligence that does not influence the thinking of a decision-maker is not intelligence*. The three-i model (Figure 2) explicitly addresses the relationship between analysis and decision-maker within intelligence-led policing (Ratcliffe 2003). In the model, not only does the analyst have to actively interpret the criminal environment, but also influence a decision-maker. This requires not only identification of an appropriate person or group, but also consideration of the best way to influence their thinking. Furthermore, as shown in Figure 2, when influencing decision-makers, analysts should also be cognizant of the need to make appropriate recommendations regarding how to have an effective *impact* on the criminal environment.




Figure 2. Three-i model of intelligence-led policing.

Source: Ratcliffe (2003, and see 2008), reproduced with permission.

While the three-i model is a conceptualization of ILP, a second model explains how it can function in practice. Greater Manchester Against Crime (GMAC) have established a Partnership Business Model (PBM) that provides a link between strategic planning and tactical operations not only for police, but for the public safety outcomes of the health service, ambulance, probation, community safety and drug action teams, youth offending teams and local municipal authorities (for details, see www.gmac.org.uk). The GMAC PBM is designed to allow time for the analysis of information and data from all of the partners and to feedback strategic priorities to those agencies in a coordinated sense with their planning and budget cycles (GMPA/GMP nd). The model has been independently evaluated as an example of best practice (John et al. 2006) and it is easy to see why. It incorporates both strategic and tactical cycles that integrate with each other while allowing senior staff to concentrate on long-term crime priorities, and mid-level managers to focus on tactical outcomes (Figure 3). In effect, a strategic overview informs local targets (Flitcroft 2006)¹.

¹ Within GMAC, the business cycle actually operates on two levels, but for space and convenience only one level is shown here. The figure shown is the regional cycle; however, the district/local authority cycle is identical but simply offset earlier by three months. The purpose of the offset is to allow the strategic

There are a number of advantages to the GMAC model from the analyst’s perspective. The time frames bring a sense of predictability to the provision of the strategic assessment as well as clarity about the role of non-police partners. The tactical meetings (held either monthly or every two weeks) are not so frequent that meeting preparation consumes all the available time (compare this time frame to police departments with weekly Compstat meetings). Finally, the recognition of the difference between a strategic partnership business group and a tactical group makes clear that there is a specific role for strategic analysis in the model.

The model also has advantages for decision-makers. There is considerable capacity to include non-enforcement agencies at the strategic level resulting in an opportunity to recruit other government and non-government agencies to assist with crime prevention and disruption. With less emphasis on individual offenders at the strategic level, there are fewer privacy concerns and intelligence products can be more widely disseminated to potential crime reduction partners. The focus on a strategy set once a year (during September in the GMAC model shown) enables long-term solutions to be considered with a time frame that is more realistic regarding solution implementation. In other words, the simple fact of deciding the main priorities for a whole year (updated every 3 or 6 months) allows decision-makers to implement more considered and prevention-oriented strategies than the ubiquitous saturation or directed patrols – the short-term band-aid and favored tactic of police commanders with time pressures, limited imagination, and a lack of other resources. Finally, the model is timed to coincide with the budget cycles of organizations that can contribute to crime reduction programs.

assessments of the local areas to be reflected in the region-wide strategic assessment (Superintendent Dave Flitcroft, Greater Manchester Police, personal communication, March 2009).




Figure 3. GMAC Partnership Business Model.
Adapted from Flitcroft (2006).

With the limitations inherent in the intelligence cycle - in that it does not incorporate decision-makers - the three-i model (interpret, influence, impact) is a more appropriate conceptual model for intelligence-led policing and one that places greater emphasis on the need for analysts to work with decision-makers. There are many ways to implement this conceptual approach, but the GMAC model is one evaluated framework that can provide management with the strategic insight to anticipate risk and target action.

The evidence for an intelligence-led policing approach

Given that intelligence-led policing is a relative newcomer to the lexicon of policing, it is not

surprising that there have been fewer formal research studies than have been conducted on other policing styles. But this does not mean that we cannot make any statements regarding the effectiveness of intelligence-led policing.

Returning to the parts of the definition of intelligence-led policing as a model that reduces crime through both strategic management and effective enforcement strategies that target prolific and serious offenders; the question should arise at this point – where is the evidence that this approach is effective? There are two outcomes that have been thoroughly evaluated: *strategic management* (a broad term used here as a proxy to represent problem-oriented policing), and *enforcement strategies that target prolific and serious offenders*.

There is strong evidence to support the crime reduction effects of problem-oriented policing (Scott et al. 2008). That being said, problem-oriented policing is hard to evaluate because it is not so much a specific tactic but rather a methodology from which a suitable crime reduction tactic can be identified. In this it is not dissimilar to intelligence-led policing. Sherman and Eck's meta-analysis of problem-oriented policing at 'hot places', in other words geographically focused, found (with one exception) substantial and statistically significant reductions in crime at targeted locations (Sherman and Eck 2002; Sherman et al. 1998). Furthermore, focused tactics to reduce the instance of gun violence and gun carrying were also evaluated as successful. Sherman and Eck summarized their findings by stating, "There is considerable evidence based on strong evaluations that problem-oriented policing is an effective way to reduce crime" (2002: 321).

The second outcome in the intelligence-led policing definition is *enforcement strategies that target prolific and serious offenders*. Again, the Sherman and Eck meta-analysis is a useful summary of the existing research, and again, this is supportive of focused police activity. Not only is there consistent scientific evidence that concentrating police patrols to high crime areas at the peak times of criminal activity is effective, but also, "the evidence on the focused proactive arrest hypothesis is generally supportive across a wide range of studies and research designs" (Sherman and Eck 2002: 312).

For example, police in Australia were able to substantially reduce burglaries in Canberra by focusing patrol activity in burglary hotspots and through the intelligence-led targeting of repeat offenders. With a weekly city average of about 146 burglaries prior to the adoption of an intelligence-led policing approach, they were able to reduce this total by over 50 burglaries a week. Furthermore, because of the incarceration of repeat offenders, the benefits extended for months after the police operation had concluded (Makkai et al. 2004; Ratcliffe and Makkai 2004).

So the strategic outcomes of conducting strategic management of crime and policing problems, and effective enforcement strategies that target prolific and serious offenders are effective; but what about the business model to deliver these outcomes? While there are potentially many different approaches, one model that has been evaluated is the Greater Manchester Against Crime Partnership Business Model (GMAC PBM) mentioned earlier. Tim John and his colleagues (2006) performed an independent evaluation of the GMAC PBM against five criteria; their data warehouse, the effective use of information technology, the role of Strategic Analytical Partnership Coordinators, the core decision making documents, and the GMAC PBM itself. Not only did they find each of the core components were fit for purpose, but their evaluation concluded that the strategic assessment documents were exemplars of best practice in the field.

The GMAC PBM has a number of key components. Firstly, there is an explicit strategic planning function. This is important because it draws police commanders into a collaborative, coproduction model of crime control delivery with other key stakeholders in the field. The strategic function also prevents an over-reliance on chasing unsustainable short-term gains (a criticism leveled at the Compstat process, see Scott et al. 2008). Secondly, the model explicitly ties the role of analytical products developed by crime and intelligence analysts to a clear decision-making structure. The inclusion of decision-makers into a conceptual model of intelligence-led policing is missing from the intelligence cycle (a criticism that I've leveled in the past, see Ratcliffe 2008a) but is central to the three-i model and the GMAC PBM. This is important because the GMAC PBM delivers: Over 90 percent of participants in the GMAC partnership business groups said that the delivery of crime and disorder solutions had been improved through the GMAC PBM (John et al. 2006: 49). Finally, the combination of a strategic and tactical approach demonstrates that police can successfully incorporate working with partner agencies within a framework that still allows for a

focus on crime and disorder hotspots and the targeting of prolific and serious offenders.

Holistic crime management

This chapter has suggested that intelligence-led policing is about anticipating risk and influencing action. Increasingly, risk is being conceptualized as more than just crime, but rather as *social harm* (Hillyard and Tombs 2007). This suggests not only a broadening of the threats that the community face to include quality of life, traffic problems and financial hardships, but also a widening of the potential solutions and partners that police can work with to prevent harm. In a holistic environment, a combination of crime analysis and criminal intelligence is paramount, where the former tells a decision-maker *what* is happening, while the latter can explain *why* (Ratcliffe 2007). This combination of 'old knowledge' (criminal intelligence) with 'new knowledge' from crime analysis is essential if decision-makers are to get a complete picture of the criminal environment (Ratcliffe 2008b). Unfortunately, resistance to merging these two important information sources runs deep in law enforcement.

With a combination of crime analysis and criminal intelligence, decision-makers can start to tackle long-term crime problems. The importance of patterns was stated at the start of this chapter, and in the first law of crime intelligence: *The most reliable indication of future criminal activity is current criminal activity*. Just to reiterate a point from earlier: this is not to say we should ignore emerging and fluctuating problems; however, a central role of intelligence-led policing is the *efficient* use of police and intelligence resources. Efficiency will come from tackling both perennial problems and hotspots, and serious and recidivist offenders.

There also remains a significant challenge to operationally integrate intelligence-led policing into the police organization (Carter 2004). There is still a widespread fixation with short-term tactical outcomes that traps police departments into an endless cycle of trying to rush cops from

data-driven hotspot to data-driven hotspot. Irrespective of how data-informed and real-time these reflexive tactics become, in the absence of a strategic management plan they still represent old-fashioned reactive policing. This may seem contrary to my first law of crime intelligence in the preceding paragraph, but the purpose of the law is to focus strategic crime management activity, not short-term reactive policing.

The solution is for both sides (analysts and decision-makers) to come to the party. It is often forgotten that the overarching aim of intelligence-led policing is for good *policing* rather than just good intelligence. The analytical community would sometimes do well to remember this. Equally, decision-makers have to lift their gaze beyond immediate short-term outcomes that are frequently fleeting and Pyrrhic victories and recognize that the aim is for intelligence-led *policing* and not just intelligence-led *investigations*. There is a real need for decision-makers to view crime intelligence as valuable beyond investigative case support, and as a pivotal aid to an objective decision-making framework that strives for strategic management of crime problems. As the former Chief Constable of Kent Police noted recently, "Strategy is about making the best use of resource, time, and space. It is also about recognizing the contingencies on the wider canvas and identifying a winning formula in the prevailing context; successful operations within a losing formula avail nothing...Strategic aims are all too easily set aside for short-term advantages. Strategic oversight is therefore an ongoing responsibility" (Phillips 2008: 29).

Carter and Carter (2009) note that US law enforcement agencies may have some issues regarding the adoption of intelligence-led policing. No legacy of widespread intelligence use, an ill-defined intelligence function, a lack of training and expertise, and widespread lack of police department size may all hamper intelligence capacity development. They are spot-on in their analysis, but their critique also acts as a roadmap to the challenges for agencies striving to be intelligence-led. Intelligence-led policing is

not just about intelligence, but about policing. A greater integration of the intelligence function into the decision-making processes of policing will allow analysts to have the impact their contribution to crime reduction demands, and

permit police leadership to escape the noxious gravitational pull of short-term crises and move towards a more holistic, strategic and, ultimately, successful crime reduction strategy.

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